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Unveiling Management’s Crystal Ball 
INTRODUCTION 
Have you ever wanted to look into a crystal ball and predict the future? 
Although not always accurate, most companies have the ability to look 
into their “crystal ball” and make predictions for the future of the business. 
Companies may disclose this forward-looking information to shareholders 
or potential investors, but may also choose not to unveil the crystal ball, 
considering that the predictions could have a negative impact on their 
current stock prices. If a company’s investors suspect a company’s 
statements were materially false or misleading, the investors may bring a 
securities fraud class action lawsuit, claiming the company omitted certain 
material forward-looking information that likely would have had a 
negative impact on revenues and profits.1  
Item 303 under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (“Securities 
Act”), the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (“Exchange 
Act”), and the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, as amended 
(collectively “Item 303”) requires that reporting companies disclose 
information about the companies’ plans and outlooks for the future of their 
businesses.2 The Second and Ninth Circuits—the two United States circuit 
courts hearing the most securities fraud cases—have interpreted the 
jurisprudence differently and thus are divided on the legal consequences of 
management’s failure to provide adequate forward-looking information.3 
The two interpretations come from a Third Circuit opinion about whether a 
material omission of Item 303 forward-looking information could be the 
foundation of a Rule 10b-5 securities fraud claim.4 The Third Circuit 
reasoned that a violation of Item 303’s reporting requirements5—the most 
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 1. See Item 303, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2016).  
 2. See id. 
 3. John Stigi & Madalyn Macarr, Second Circuit Notes Split with Ninth Circuit 
Over Whether Failure to Make Adequate Disclosures Under Item 303 of Regulation 
S-K May Serve as Basis for Section 10(b) Claim, SHEPPARDMULLIN: CORP. & SEC. 




 4. Compare In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1054–55 (9th 
Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2349 (2015), with Stratte-McClure v. Morgan 
Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 103–04 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 5. For a detailed explanation of Item 303’s reporting requirements see infra 
Part I.E. 




significant public disclosures focusing on current operations and 
management’s plans for the future6—“does not automatically give rise to a 
material omission under Rule 10b-5” and result in related liability,7 but the 
circuits have not universally accepted this reasoning.8 
Some circuits, such as the Ninth Circuit, assert that Item 303 does not 
create a duty to disclose for purposes of Section 10(b) under the Exchange 
Act (“Section 10(b)”) and SEC Rule 10b-5 promulgated under Section 
10(b) (“Rule 10b-5”).9 However, other circuits, such as the Second Circuit, 
hold that a Section 10(b) claim arises when a company fails to make 
required Item 303 disclosures and the “materiality” requirements as set 
forth by the United States Supreme Court in Basic v. Levinson are 
satisfied.10 While the United States Supreme Court had an opportunity to 
resolve this conflict in 2015, it refused to grant a writ of certiorari on this 
issue.11 
To eliminate cross-circuit disparity and provide clarity regarding 
whether omitted Item 303 information is subject to a claim under Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the United States Supreme Court should review the 
Ninth and Second Circuits’ conflicting analyses when given the 
opportunity. Further, the Supreme Court should adopt the Second Circuit’s 
conclusion and hold that failure to make a mandatory Item 303 disclosure 
is a material omission that can serve as the foundation for a securities fraud 
claim under Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5, because Item 303 creates a duty 
to disclose material information.12 This unifying effort helps achieve the 
                                                                                                             
 6. 2 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION § 9.4[7][C], at 30 (4th ed. 2002). 
 7. Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 288 (3d Cir. 2000). See also 17 C.F.R. § 
229.303. 
 8. Compare NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d at 1056 (“[I]tem 303 does 
not create a duty to disclose for purposes of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”), with 
Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 100 (“[A] failure to make a required Item 303 
disclosure . . . is indeed an omission that can serve as the basis for a Section 10(b) 
securities fraud claim.”). 
 9. See, e.g., NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d at 1056. 
 10. See, e.g., Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 100 (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 
485 U.S. 224 (1988)). 
 11. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Cohen v. NVIDIA Corp., 135 S. 
Ct. 2349 (2015) (No. 14-975) (declining to resolve “[w]hether Item 303 of 
Regulation S-K forms the basis for a duty to disclose otherwise material 
information for purposes of an omission actionable under § 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 as the Second Circuit recently held in direct 
conflict with the Ninth Circuit’s holding in this case”).  
 12. See Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 101. 




purpose of the Exchange Act.13 Additionally, the circuits’ agreement on 
the application of Item 303 in a 10b-5 class action lawsuit provides clear 
guidance to the investors and helps to promote integrity in the capital 
markets.14  
This Comment proceeds in five parts. Part I provides background 
information concerning the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, including the 
Court’s interpretation of materiality in Basic Inc. v. Levinson,15 and Item 
303.16 Part II explains the evolution of the approach adopted by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) regarding the disclosure of 
forward-looking information.17 This Part focuses primarily on the SEC’s 
1989 interpretative release, which illustrated the SEC’s modern approach 
to Item 303 disclosures, demonstrating that the modern approach should 
not be used as a rationale for preventing private securities fraud causes of 
action.18 Part III describes the differences between a private cause of action 
for securities fraud under Rule 10b-5 and the cease-and-desist powers of 
the SEC, including the benefits of both, demonstrating that the SEC’s 
powers are an ineffective deterrent to securities fraud.19 Part IV describes 
the various approaches courts have taken to Item 303, focusing on three 
recent holdings from the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits.20 Finally, Part 
V proposes that the Supreme Court adopt the findings in Stratte-McClure 
v. Morgan Stanley21—making a party liable for federal securities fraud 
                                                                                                             
 13. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the purpose 
of the Exchange Act is to implement a “philosophy of full disclosure.” Basic Inc. 
v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988) (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 
430 U.S. 462, 477–78 (1977)).  
 14. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Materiality Guidance in the Context of 
Insider Trading: A Call for Action, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1169 (2003) (“Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 were designed to protect investors and promote the integrity 
of our securities markets by preventing fraud, manipulation, and deception in 
connection with the purchase or sale of a security.”). 
 15. The United States Supreme Court also analyzed the reliance factor of a 
10b-5 class action lawsuit, proclaiming a presumption of reliance, but only the 
materiality analysis is relevant to this Comment. See Basic, 485 U.S. 224. 
 16. See infra Part I.A–E. 
 17. See infra Part II.A–B. 
 18. See infra Part II.A–B. 
 19. See infra Part III.A–B. 
 20. See infra Part IV.A–C. 
 21. The Second Circuit interpreted Item 303 as creating a disclosure duty. 
Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 2015). Accordingly, if a class of 
investors satisfies the Basic materiality standard, as well as the additional 10b-5 
elements, then the class could recover damages for fraudulent material omissions 
by a company. See id. at 100.  




under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 due to a material omission of Item 
303 forward-looking information.22 
I. PEEKING INTO MANAGEMENT’S CRYSTAL BALL 
Rooted in the Exchange Act,23 and, more specifically, promulgated by 
the SEC under Section 10(b),24 Rule 10b-525 is designed to protect private 
investors and deter issuers of securities from engaging in fraudulent 
conduct.26 Until 1980, when Regulation S-K was enacted, there were no 
means to satisfy the Exchange Act’s disclosure requirements in an 
integrated manner.27 Regulation S-K is a securities regulatory scheme that 
was designed to satisfy the filing requirements under the Securities Act28 
and the Exchange Act.29 Particularly, Item 303 mandates that a company 
must file certain information with the SEC, including known trends and 
uncertainties relating to liquidity, capital resources, and results of 
operations.30 Although the United States Supreme Court has proclaimed a 
basic rule for materiality,31 the lower courts are split as to its application 
to a securities fraud lawsuit relating to a material omission of forward-
looking information.32 
                                                                                                             
 22. See infra Part V. 
 23. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78nn (2012). 
 24. Id. § 78j. 
 25. 17 C.F.R § 240.10b-5 (2016).  
 26. See Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 760 (5th Cir. 1974) (“The 
basic intent of . . . [R]ule 10b-5 . . . is to protect investors and instill confidence 
in the securities markets by penalizing unfair dealings.”). 
 27. See Amendments to Annual Report Form, Related Forms, Rules, 
Regulations, and Guides; Integration of Securities Acts Disclosure Systems, 
Exchange Act Release No. 33–6231, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,630 (Sept. 2, 1980) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).  
 28. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa. 
 29. See Exchange Act Release No. 33–6231, supra note 27. Regulation S-K 
is a broad array of instructions to provide guidance to issuers as to the information 
they must provide in all documents filed with the SEC. This includes, but is not 
limited to, instructions for filing registration statements and periodic disclosure 
reports.  
 30. Item 303, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303.  
 31. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238–39 (1988).  
 32. Compare NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1056 (9th Cir. 2014), 
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2349 (2015), with Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 
776 F.3d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 2015).  




A. Congressional Creation of the Securities Exchange Act 
Congress enacted landmark securities legislation in 1933 and 1934—
the Securities Act33 and the Exchange Act,34 respectively (collectively “the 
Acts”). The purpose of the Acts was to protect investors by promoting 
transparency in the marketplace.35 Similar to the Securities Act’s mandate 
that issuers register their securities for the benefit of persons purchasing 
securities in primary markets, the policy underlying the Exchange Act 
requires the registration of securities to protect those investors purchasing 
in secondary markets.36 In addition to Congress’s explicit policy 
pronouncement for the Exchange Act, several other rationales underlie the 
enactment of the Exchange Act. A long line of cases support the assertions 
that “[m]anipulation and dishonest practices of the market place thrive 
upon mystery and secrecy”37 and that the core purpose of the Exchange 
Act is to implement full disclosure.38 The Supreme Court has also stated 
that the Exchange Act was promulgated to address investors’ fear of being 
injured by manipulated stock prices.39 One commentator has proclaimed 
that the purpose of the Exchange Act was to reform the markets to control 
speculation, prevent insider trading, and eliminate other forms of market 
manipulation.40 Section 10(b) is an essential provision to prevent market 
manipulation.41 
B. Section 10(b) Bars the Use of Manipulative or Deceptive Devices  
Section 10(b) prohibits a person from employing or exercising “any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such 
                                                                                                             
 33. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa. 
 34. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78nn. 
 35. Alison B. Miller, Comment, Navigating the Disclosure Dilemma: 
Corporate Illegality and the Federal Securities Laws, 102 GEO L.J. 1647, 1652 
(2014). 
 36. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa; see also id. § 78b. For more 
information on the similar policies underlying the Acts, see CHARLES J. JOHNSON, JR. 
ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE AND THE SECURITIES LAWS § 1.02–1.03 (5th ed. 2015). 
 37. Basic Inc. v. Levison, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 
73-1383 (1934)). 
 38. See, e.g., id. at 230 (citing Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 
462, 477–78, (1977) (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 
U.S. 180, 186 (1963))). 
 39. Id. at 230 (citing S.Rep. No. 73-792 (1934)). 
 40. Comment, Market Manipulation and the Securities Exchange Act, 46 
YALE L.J. 624, 629 (1937). 
 41. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j. 




rules and regulations as the Commission [SEC] may prescribe.”42 Section 
10(b) was designed by Congress as a “catchall clause” to enable the SEC 
to deal with the evolving array of manipulative devices.43 The Court argues 
that the legislative history of the Exchange Act fails to provide the 
intended scope of Section 10(b).44 The applicability of Section 10(b) to 
certain private securities fraud causes of action remains unanswered. 
C. The SEC Promulgates Rule 10b-5 to Create Liability for Materially 
Misleading Statements or Omissions 
In 1942, the SEC wielded its authority under Section 10(b) and 
promulgated Rule 10b-5.45 This rule makes it impermissible for any person 
engaged in the sale of securities “[t]o make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make 
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security.”46 Moreover, the rule provides two additional restrictions.47 
A person must not engage in fraudulent acts by use of “any device, 
scheme, or artifice,” nor “engage in any act, practice, or course of business 
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person . . . 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”48 Rule 10b-5 has 
generally been viewed as a “fraud-based” remedy due to its scienter 
requirement.49 
To recover damages in a private federal securities fraud action under 
Rule 10b-5, a party must satisfy the requirements implied by Section 10(b) 
as enumerated by the Supreme Court.50 Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
promulgated under the Exchange Act require a plaintiff to prove the 
following: “(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; 
(2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission 
and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the 
misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.”51 
                                                                                                             
 42. Id.  
 43. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976). 
 44. Id. at 202. 
 45. Id. at 195–96. 
 46. 17 C.F.R § 240.10b-5 (2016).  
 47. See id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. JOHNSON, JR. ET AL., supra note 36, § 5.02[C].  
 50. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC, v. Scientific–Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 
148, 157 (2008).  
 51. Id. 




There is no express indication by Congress or the SEC that Section 
10(b) or Rule 10b-5 provides a private civil remedy for violating said 
provisions.52 But it is now generally accepted that Rule 10b-5 establishes an 
implied private remedy that is applicable to all purchases and sales of 
securities.53  
D. A Uniform Standard of Materiality for a 10b-5 Action 
The United States Supreme Court in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, 
Inc.54 was confronted with what the standard for “materiality” is in the 
context of proxy statements.55 The Court noted that the question of 
materiality was objective and involved “the significance of an omitted or 
misrepresented fact to a reasonable investor.”56 Announcing the “total 
mix” standard, the Court held that omitted facts are material when there is 
a “substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have 
been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 
‘total mix’ of information made available.”57  
More than a decade later, in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, the Court again 
faced questions regarding the standard of materiality.58 When asked to 
determine the proper standard of materiality for a 10b-5 securities fraud 
action in the context of preliminary corporate merger talks,59 the Court 
adopted the TSC Industries materiality standard for Rule 10b-5 actions.60 
However, the Court noted that the TSC Industries standard may only be 
effective in this context for certain and clear information.61 It was 
necessary that a new standard be created because the TSC Industries 
                                                                                                             
 52. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976).  
 53. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that there is an 
implied cause of action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. See Blue Chip 
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975) (first citing 
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971), and 
then citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 150 (1972)). 
See also JOHNSON, JR. ET AL., supra note 36, §5.01[C]. 
 54. 426 U.S. 438 (1976). 
 55. Id. at 448–49. A proxy statement is “[a]n informational document that 
accompanies a proxy solicitation and explains a proposed action (such as a merger) 
by the corporation.” Proxy Statement, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
 56. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 445. 
 57. Id. at 449.  
 58. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 226 (1988).  
 59. Id. at 226–27. 
 60. Id. at 232. 
 61. Id. See also id. at 232 n.9. 




standard made it difficult to determine if a “reasonable investor” would 
consider omissions of speculative information significant.62  
Thus, the Court announced a balancing test to determine the 
materiality of speculative or forward-looking information in the 10b-5 
context.63 A court must balance “the indicated probability that the event 
will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality 
of the company activity.”64 To determine the probability of the event 
occurring, “a factfinder will need to look to indicia of interest in the 
transaction at the highest corporate levels” and “consider such facts as the 
size of the two corporate entities and of the potential premiums over 
market value” to determine the magnitude of the transaction.65  
In a footnote, the Court noted that “[s]ilence, absent a duty to disclose, 
is not misleading under Rule 10b-5.”66 This statement has resonated 
throughout the courts and has proved to be extremely significant in the 
context of liability for forward-looking material omissions. A plain 
reading of Rule 10b-5 leads a reader to conclude that only existing facts, 
which are misleading and material, are actionable, but the Court 
effectively expanded the scope of Rule 10b-5 in Basic by recognizing that 
speculative, forward-looking information may be actionable under 10b-5 
if it satisfies the balancing test for the materiality of speculative 
information.67 Safe harbor provisions now protect issuers from liability 
when they disclose material forward-looking information with the SEC.68  
E. Item 303 Mandates That a Company Must File Certain Material 
Information with the SEC  
Item 303—Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial 
Condition and Results of Operations (“MD&A”)—requires issuers to 
disclose information, whether historical or forward-looking,69 necessary to 
                                                                                                             
 62. See id. at 232. 
 63. Id. at 238–40. 
 64. Id. at 238 (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d 
Cir. 1968)). 
 65. Id. at 239. 
 66. Id. at 239 n.17. 
 67. See Miller, supra note 35, at 1654. See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016) 
(“It shall be unlawful . . . “[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to 
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made . . . 
not misleading . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 68. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.175.  
 69. In one SEC safe harbor provision, forward-looking information includes 
projections of financial information, a statement of management’s plans and 




permit “investors and other users to assess the financial condition and 
results of operations of the registrant, with particular emphasis on the 
registrant’s prospects for the future.”70 Item 303 falls within the broad 
regulatory scheme of Regulation S-K,71 and more narrowly within the 
subdivision for disclosures of financial information.72 MD&A’s principal 
purpose is to provide investors with the material information necessary to 
garner an understanding of a company’s current and future financial 
standing.73  
Item 303 requires that the issuer discuss its financial condition, 
changes in financial condition, and results of operations, focusing on a 
company’s liquidity, capital resources, results of operations, off-balance 
sheet arrangements, and contractual obligations.74 Not only must the 
required information be disclosed, but Item 303 includes a catchall 
provision, requiring an issuer to “provide such other information” to 
permit an investor to grasp an understanding of the issuer’s financial 
condition, any changes to that financial condition, as well as the results of 
the issuer’s operations.75  
The issuer must disclose any “known trends” that are “reasonably 
likely” to materially increase or decrease the company’s liquidity in any 
way,76 describe its material commitments for capital expenditures, and 
disclose any known material trends in the company’s capital resources.77 
Moreover, Item 303 requires an issuer to provide all known trends the 
issuer reasonably believes will materially alter net sales, revenues, or 
income and will continue for the foreseeable future to affect its SEC 
filings.78 In addition, Item 303 requires a company to disclose certain off-
balance sheet arrangements79 and its contractual obligations.80 
                                                                                                             
objectives for future operations, and a statement of future economic performance 
contained in MD&A. See id. 
 70. Management’s Discussion & Analysis of Financial Condition & Results 
of Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Securities Act Release 
No. 6835, 43 SEC Docket 1330 (May 18, 1989). 
 71. 17 C.F.R. § 229.10. 
 72. Id. § 229.300. 
 73. Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Discussion and Analysis 
of Financial Condition & Results of Operation, Securities Act Release No. 8350, 81 
SEC Docket 2905 (Dec. 19, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 211, 231, 241). 
 74. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. § 229.303 (a)(1). 
 77. Id. § 229.303(a)(2). 
 78. Id. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii). 
 79. Id. § 229.303(a)(4). 
 80. Id. § 229.303 (a)(5). 




Item 303’s instructions provide considerable guidance to registrants. 
The instructions mention the applicability of safe harbor provisions.81 Item 
303(c) provides that the statutory safe harbors provided in Section 27A of 
the Securities Act82 and Section 21E of the Exchange Act83 shall apply to 
forward-looking information disclosed, whether by an issuer or someone 
directly associated with the issuer, under Item 303.84 In addition to the 
statutory safe harbors, the SEC promulgated Rule 175—a safe harbor for 
projections—to provide additional protection to a company disclosing 
forward-looking information.85 Under this rule, forward-looking 
information is immune from liability when supported by a reasonable basis 
and made in good faith.86 These safe harbor provisions protect mandatory 
forward-looking statements made pursuant to Item 303,87 but these 
protections are inapposite when a company fails to disclose material 
information in MD&A regarding a particular uncertainty or trend.88  
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE SEC’S VIEW ON 
UNVEILING THE CRYSTAL BALL 
MD&A has been described as one of the most challenging sections to 
prepare in a prospectus or other SEC filings.89 As it relates to a Rule 10b-5 
class action lawsuit, there is a lack of uniformity among the courts as to the 
proper standard of materiality to be used in determining what disclosure is 
required.90 Some courts say it is the standard set forth by the SEC; others argue 
it is the standard set forth in Basic for speculative, forward-looking 
information.91 This controversy has incidentally perplexed courts as to 
whether Item 303 creates a duty to disclose for purposes of a private securities 
fraud lawsuit. 
                                                                                                             
 81. Id. § 229.303 (c). 
 82. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77z–2 (2012). 
 83. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u–5. 
 84. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(c). 
 85. Id. § 230.175 (Rule 175). 
 86. Id. 
 87. See id. § 229.303(a); see also Brian Neach, Comment, Item 303’s Role in 
Private Causes of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws, 76 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 741, 744–45 (2001). 
 88. Id. 
 89. JOHNSON, JR. ET AL., supra note 36, § 3.04[B]. 
 90. See, e.g., In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1055 (9th Cir. 
2014); but see Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 91. Id. See, e.g., In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d at 1055; but see 
Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 100. 




A. Traditional MD&A Disclosure Requirements 
MD&A in federal securities law dates back to 1968 when the SEC 
adopted the Guides for Preparation and Filing of Registration Statements.92 
Until that time, the SEC barred registrants from including projections in 
prospectuses and reports filed with the SEC.93  
In 1973, the SEC issued a statement that its position never was to 
require disclosure of projections and that its position was not going to 
change.94 The SEC intended to take steps toward incorporating projections 
into the disclosure system, but it refused to determine if an issuer would be 
required to disclose its projections.95 This statement marks the beginning of 
the SEC’s transition in certain circumstances from prohibiting forward-
looking information to requiring its disclosure. An SEC commissioner 
issued a statement proposing that the SEC would lift its prohibition on 
disclosing forward-looking projections for issuers who satisfy standards that 
would be determined at a later time.96 Those issuers who elected to file 
projections would “be required to update those projections on a regular 
basis, as well as in the event of material changes in the projections.”97 Once 
a company started, it could not stop maintaining its forward-looking 
information. 
In 1975, the SEC proposed a set of rules and forms to establish a 
sophisticated disclosure system for companies who sought to disclose 
forward-looking information.98 Nearly one year later, the SEC decided to 
withdraw all but one of the proposals in the face of mounting legal, policy, 
and technical issues.99 However, this was not the end of the journey. After 
the SEC’s Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure recommended 
the SEC announce that companies should voluntarily disclose forward-
                                                                                                             
 92. Concept Release on Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial 
Condition and Operations, Securities Act Release No. 6711, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,715 
(Apr. 17, 1987). 
 93. Statement by the Commission on the Disclosure of Projections of Future 
Economic Performance, Securities Act Release No. 5362, 1 SEC Docket 11 (Feb. 2, 
1973). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Rule and Form Proposals, Securities Act Release No. 5581, 6 SEC Docket 
771 (Apr. 28, 1975); Guides for Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic 
Performance, Securities Act Release No. 5992, 1978 WL 208169 (Nov. 7, 1978). 
 99. Notice of Adoption of Amendment to Rule 14a-9, Securities Act Release 
No. 5699, 9 SEC Docket 472 (Apr. 23, 1976); Securities Act Release No. 5992, 
supra note 98. 




looking information,100 the SEC issued a statement encouraging, but not 
requiring, the disclosure of management projections.101 
B. Modern MD&A Disclosure Requirements 
The SEC entered MD&A’s modern era of disclosure in 1980 when it 
adopted the present form of disclosure requirements.102 To improve 
disclosure, reduce the burdens associated with disclosure, and facilitate 
integrated disclosure under the Securities Acts, the SEC announced 
amendments to Form 10-K103 and “to related forms, rules, regulations and 
guides under the [Acts].”104 The final rule proposed an incorporated Form 
10-K and the addition of Item 11 to Regulation S-K, which “would not 
specifically require projections or other forward-looking information, 
although the presentation of this type of information on a voluntary basis 
would be encouraged.”105 In 1981, after conducting a review of disclosures 
prepared in accordance with the newly adopted disclosure requirements, 
the SEC provided practitioners with guidance for MD&A.106 The SEC 
eventually adopted the integrated disclosure system and included Item 
                                                                                                             
 100. Id. 
 101. Id.; see also Isquith v. Middle S. Utils., Inc., 847 F.2d 186, 205 (5th Cir. 
1988). 
 102. While the Commission's indecisive history of standards for forward-
looking information may seem abstract, its progression can reasonably lead a 
person to conclude that the Commission was approaching a conclusory position 
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303, or Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition 
and Results of Operation, in the final rule.107 
1. The SEC’s 1989 Interpretative Release Created the Current 
Circuit Split 
In 1987, the SEC sought public comment on MD&A standards and on 
several proposed revisions.108 It noted that issuers are not required, but are 
encouraged, to supply certain forward-looking information.109 In 1989, the 
SEC issued a landmark interpretative release, which declared that Item 303 
partially requires the disclosure of forward-looking information.110 For 
example, the release stated, “MD&A requires discussions of ‘known 
trends or any known demands, commitments, events or uncertainties that 
will result in or that are reasonably likely to result in the registrant’s 
liquidity increasing or decreasing in any material way.’”111 MD&A’s 
focus, illustrated in the Instructions to Item 303, is solely on known 
material events and uncertainties “that would cause reported financial 
information not to be necessarily indicative of future operating results or 
of future financial condition.”112 
The SEC emphasized the difference between required and optional 
disclosures. A company is required to disclose forward-looking information 
under Item 303 when it concludes that it is reasonably expected that known 
trends, events, and uncertainties will have a material effect.113 The 
information need not be disclosed when a company is merely “anticipating 
a future trend or event or anticipating a less predictable impact of a known 
event, trend or uncertainty.”114 
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To assist companies in determining whether the specific forward-looking 
information in MD&A needs to be disclosed, the SEC created a two-prong 
test.115 The two-prong assessment should be conducted when management 
knows of trends, demands, commitments, events, or uncertainties.116 It 
requires management to ask: 
(1) Is the known trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty 
likely to come to fruition? If management determines that it is not 
reasonably likely to occur, no disclosure it required. (2) If 
management cannot make that determination, it must evaluate 
objectively the consequences of the known trend, demand, 
commitment, event or uncertainty, on the assumption that it will 
come to fruition. Disclosure is then required unless management 
determines that a material effect on the registrant’s financial 
condition or results of operations is not reasonably likely to 
occur.117  
The SEC further noted that the Supreme Court’s probability–magnitude 
test for materiality in Basic v. Levinson was inapposite for MD&A because 
MD&A requires specific disclosure and declares its own standard for 
disclosure.118 This indicates the SEC’s intention to make companies liable 
in court for federal securities fraud because the company has a duty to 
disclose material, forward-looking information. However, some courts 
have held that this is not the case.119  
2. The SEC Provides Issuers Additional Guidance Regarding Item 
303 Disclosures 
The SEC did not issue another interpretive release providing issuers 
with additional guidance on how to respond to MD&A requirements until 
2003.120 It described MD&A’s intent, namely to provide “readers with 
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information ‘necessary to an understanding of [a company’s] financial 
condition, changes in financial condition and results of operations,’” and 
claimed that MD&A was not particularly complicated.121 This is striking 
considering the numerous safe harbors available to issuers providing 
forward-looking information under Item 303.122 
The 2003 release reaffirmed that the purpose of MD&A is to allow an 
investor or interested party to look at a company “through the eyes of those 
who manage that business.”123 With regard to the focus and context of the 
MD&A, the SEC proposed that companies should eliminate immaterial 
information that does not relate to the issuer’s financial condition, liquidity 
and capital resources, changes in financial condition, and results of 
operations from its MD&A disclosures.”124 The SEC further stated that 
MD&A aims to develop disclosure, which permits a contextual analysis 
of financial information and allows investors to determine if past 
performance is telling of future performance.125 
III. THE SEC’S INSUFFICIENT REMEDIES CALL FOR 
UNVEILING THE CRYSTAL BALL 
A sufficient remedy must be available to investors when a company 
abuses disclosure requirements. An investor must be able to adequately 
recover if a company fails to comply with Item 303’s duty to disclose 
forward-looking information. The securities regulatory domain has two 
remedial bodies—the SEC and the courts. Each provides a distinct set of 
remedies.126 Whether the SEC or the courts are the proper authority to 
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remedy a material omission of forward-looking information is disputed.127 
The courts are the superior alternative because investors are offered remedial 
measures that the SEC has not brought to the table. Absent such a remedy, 
unveiling management’s crystal ball, as it relates to recovering damages, is 
completely irrelevant to investors. 
A. The SEC’s Cease-and-Desist Power is an Insufficient Remedy to 
Victims of Item 303 Securities Fraud 
To prevent a business from engaging in fraudulent or manipulative 
conduct, the SEC may grant a cease-and-desist order, directing a person to 
halt illegal acts at the time of the order, as well as in the future.128 Section 8(A) 
of the Securities Act,129 Section 21C(a) of the Exchange Act,130 and other 
federal statutes grant the SEC the power to issue a cease-and-desist order to 
any person who is violating, has violated, or is about to violate any provision 
of federal securities laws.131 The Securities Enforcement Remedies Act 
provides the SEC with the power to punish issuers improperly disclosing or 
failing to disclose information through broad cease-and-desist authority.132 
Upon finding that a business has violated or will violate a provision of 
the Acts, the SEC may publish its findings and issue an order requiring the 
business “to [cease and desist] from committing or causing such violation 
and any future violation.”133 Moreover, the cease-and-desist order may 
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require the business to comply with the provision that was violated,134 
require accounting and disgorgement,135 and prohibit any person violating 
any rules or regulations established by the SEC from serving as an officer 
or director of any issuer that has a class of registered securities.136 
The SEC may also seek additional disciplinary action by barring 
issuers from the capital markets.137 After the SEC finds that a person has 
engaged in fraudulent acts, an issuer may have its securities delisted to 
promote equitable trade principles or protect investors.138 After the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC may now directly utilize the cease-and-
desist proceedings to enforce a suspension or a ban upon demonstrating 
“some risk” of future misconduct.139 Moreover, cease-and-desist 
proceedings permit the SEC to inflict civil penalties upon a company for 
any violation of the Acts.140 However, a business is subject to a maximum 
civil penalty of $500,000 for an SEC regulatory violation.141  
Although the SEC has broad authority to punish an issuer for its 
fraudulent actions, under this scenario, an investor’s personal remedies are 
limited and insufficient. The SEC may impose disgorgement damages, but 
this is insufficient for investors because the SEC rarely wields this weapon 
in Item 303 administrative actions.142 Disgorgement damages are 
analogous to a mighty sword, capable of paralyzing the party at which it 
aims its swing. However, the sword is useless if you fail to swing it. 
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Moreover, cease-and-desist actions only require a company to stop 
prospectively; these actions do nothing to permit an investor to recoup his 
or her losses retroactively. Although delisting a company appears to be 
sufficient to deter on its face, it is highly unrealistic to expect this to occur, 
absent exceptional circumstances. Alternatively, the courts provide the 
best forum for investors to adequately recover their lost investments.  
B. Rule 10b-5 Actions Deter Companies from Omitting Material 
Forward-Looking Information 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are designed to serve as the primary 
private remedies for securities fraud.143 Rule 10b-5 is much broader than 
the other rules in Section 10(b), and it may be used as a remedial measure 
for parties injured as a result of a defendant’s deceptive conduct.144 It is 
used in the context of insider trading,145 manipulative conduct,146 and, 
most importantly, false SEC filings.147  
The private cause of action is one that has been generally accepted as 
implied by Rule 10b-5.148 To bring a Rule 10b-5 securities fraud class action 
lawsuit against a registered company, a plaintiff must prove the following: 
“(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; 
(3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the 
purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or 
omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.”149  
In the context of Item 303, the level of materiality required in a 10b-5 
action is often disputed. Rule 10b-5 liability for Item 303 omissions hinges on 
whether Item 303 establishes a duty to disclose.150 The SEC reads Item 303 
as establishing a disclosure duty “where a trend, demand, commitment, event 
or uncertainty is both [(1)] presently known to management and [(2)] 
reasonably likely to have material effects on the registrant’s financial 
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condition or results of operations.”151 The standard of materiality included 
in the SEC’s 1989 interpretative release is a lower threshold than the 
Court’s standard in Basic.152 That is, less information is required to meet 
the requirements of materiality for administrative purposes. When faced 
with the disparities between the SEC’s standard and the Court’s standard, 
some courts have found that a disclosure duty is absent from Item 303 for 
purposes of a Rule 10b-5 action.153 This rationale is seemingly focused on 
the Court’s higher threshold for materiality.  
Two authors have argued that an issuer is subject to a disclosure duty 
under certain circumstances.154 Whether a duty to disclose exists will 
determine if a party violating a disclosure requirement may face a private 
class action lawsuit under Rule 10b-5.155 This discussion hinges on the 
belief that a duty to disclose material information surfaces from “(1) the 
need to make a periodic filing with the SEC that contains up-to-date 
information (such as a periodic report, a registration statement for a 
securities offering, or a proxy statement) [and] (2) a regulatory 
requirement to disclose certain specific events as they occur.”156 
Periodic reporting obligations pursuant to Sections 13(a) and 15(d) of 
the Exchange Act require issuers to file periodic reports with the SEC and 
to provide up-to-date information.157 These periodic reports, including 
annual reports on Form 10-K, quarterly reports on Form 10-Q, and current 
reports on Form 8-K, incorporate the MD&A requirements of Item 303.158 
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Because Item 303 is a line-item regulatory requirement to disclose certain 
material information, a disclosure duty appears to arise for purposes of a 
securities fraud private class action lawsuit, as the information is required 
by a periodic disclosure and regulatory requirement.159 
Although materiality is critical to a lawsuit proceeding through the 
courts, there are several other elements of a Rule 10b-5 action that must 
be satisfied. Scienter is one of the essential elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim, 
and it has narrowed the abundance of Rule 10b-5 securities class action 
lawsuits.160 The Supreme Court first held in the 1970s that the intent of the 
SEC, when enacting Rule 10b-5, was to govern activities involving 
scienter.161 Congress emphasized the Court’s scienter findings in the 
enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”)162 
and established a heightened pleading standard.163 The PSLRA requires an 
injured party to plead “with particularity facts giving rise to a strong 
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”164 
Thus, to bring a Rule 10b-5 action for a material omission of Item 303 
information, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s action of 
omitting the required information was associated with an intent to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud.  
A Rule 10b-5 claim also requires a plaintiff to prove a connection 
between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a 
security.165 Additionally, an injured party must show that he or she relied 
upon the defendant’s material misrepresentation or omission.166 The 
required causal connection between the plaintiff’s injury and the 
defendant’s omission is provided by the element of reliance.167 The Court 
has adopted a presumption of reliance through the fraud-on-the-market 
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theory.168 That is, in the context of federal securities fraud causes of action, 
there is a presumption that an investor trading an issuer’s shares did so 
based on the integrity of the stock’s value set by the market.169 Requiring 
a plaintiff to always establish explicit reliance would be impractical.170 
However, the issuer has the ability to rebut the presumption of reliance or 
show that it was unreasonable for the investor to rely on the omission.171 
Thus, in the context of Item 303 omissions, an investor need not expressly 
display reliance on the material omission. 
Most importantly, for recovery purposes, the defendant must have 
suffered economic loss, otherwise known as damages.172 Correlated to 
damages, a plaintiff must prove loss causation.173 Congress has proclaimed 
that the burden is on the plaintiff to show the causal relationship between 
his or her damages and the company’s fraudulent act or omission.174 
However, the concept of damages is meaningless if the courts hold that an 
Item 303 omission does not establish an actionable disclosure duty 
because an injured party would be incapable of recovery in the courts.  
Upon satisfying the six procedural requirements of a Rule 10b-5 
action, a class of investors should be able to achieve some form of remedy. 
However, both Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 fail to provide explicit 
provisions explaining the process of determining damages.175 Courts have 
applied Section 28 of the Exchange Act’s “actual damages” standard176 to 
Rule 10b-5 actions.177 The burden of proof lies with the plaintiff to prove 
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his or her “actual damages.”178 Moreover, a plaintiff in a Rule 10b-5 action 
may be capable of recovering punitive damages.179 Thus, the judicial 
remedy for a material omission of forward-looking information is a better 
alternative than the SEC cease-and-desist authority because not only is the 
plaintiff able to recover his or her “actual damages,” but the court may also 
deter similar conduct in the future by this issuer through the imposition of 
punitive damages. 
IV. THE SPLIT OVER UNVEILING THE CRYSTAL BALL 
Congress granted the SEC cease-and-desist authority to protect against 
persons committing isolated infractions that present less of a threat to 
investors,180 but Congress has noted that injunctive relief by the SEC is not 
always appropriate and sometimes the courts will need to get involved.181 
Unlike action taken under the SEC’s cease-and-desist powers, which merely 
corrects the issuer’s erroneous material omission,182 a private right of action 
under Rule 10b-5 inflicts a punishment on the company. However, the courts 
have failed to reach a consensus on Item 303’s role in a private cause of action 
under the Exchange Act.183 The Ninth Circuit has held that a material 
omission of forward-looking information does not impose securities fraud 
liability, while the Second Circuit, most recently, held that a material omission 
may impose liability when certain requirements are satisfied.184 The Supreme 
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Court’s recent denial of certiorari leaves the proper application of Item 303 in 
a private securities fraud cause unclear.185 
A. The Third Circuit Introduces the Modern Standard for Liability of 
Item 303 Omissions 
In 2000, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
addressed liability arising from Item 303 omissions in Oran v. Stafford and 
adopted a modernized standard.186 Oran involved a securities fraud class 
action lawsuit brought against American Home Products Corporation 
(“AHP”).187  
At the relevant times, AHP was marketing Pondimin and Redux, weight-
loss drugs approved by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”).188 In 
February of 1994, AHP learned that seven patients who had been taking drugs 
containing Pondimin and Redux began displaying symptoms of leaky heart 
valves.189 By November 1995, AHP had knowledge of at least 31 cases of 
heart valve abnormalities and had received hundreds of adverse reaction 
reports regarding symptoms often related to heart and lung problems.190 Only 
eight of the heart valve cases were reported to the FDA.191 
The Mayo Clinic reported to AHP that it had a total of 17 patients with 
heart valve abnormalities in March 1997 and disclosed 24 reports of heart 
valve abnormalities to the public on July 8, 1997.192 The Mayo Clinic, the 
FDA, and AHP all issued public announcements emphasizing that there 
was no conclusive causal evidence between the symptoms and AHP’s 
drug.193 These announcements did not have an adverse effect on AHP’s 
stock value.194 
In mid-September 1997, AHP determined that it would withdraw 
Pondimin and Redux from the market after a survey revealed that 92 of 
291 consumers had developed heart valve abnormalities.195 Unlike the 
public statement, this survey was accompanied by a press release 
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estimating a significant loss of profits.196 AHP common stock fell over 3% 
the following day.197 Shortly thereafter, major publications wrote that 
AHP had known of possible heart valve abnormalities since at least March 
1997, when the Mayo Clinic first informed AHP of the documented heart 
valve abnormalities.198 As a result, the AHP stock suffered an additional 4% 
decline in value.199 
Plaintiffs alleged that AHP made material misrepresentations and 
omissions about the safety of its prescription weight-loss drugs while failing 
to disclose numerous studies that linked the drugs to heart valve damage.200 
The district court noted that the July 1997 data disclosed by AHP was 
immaterial because there had been full disclosure of the May data without 
any appreciable effect on AHP’s stock value.201 Moreover, the earlier data 
from 1994 to 1996 was immaterial because it would not have had a 
material impact on the substance of the July 8 release.202 Finally, the 
district court held that a material omission had not occurred when AHP 
failed to disclose when it first learned of the adverse health data.203 
The Third Circuit initially affirmed the district court’s conclusion that 
AHP’s failure to disclose data was not a material omission under Rule 10b-
5.204 First, the court had to determine the validity of the plaintiffs’ 
arguments that AHP had an affirmative obligation to disclose the heart 
valve data’s effect on AHP’s future prospects under Item 303.205 The court 
noted that plaintiffs needed to show that Item 303 provides for an 
independent cause of action, or that a failure to disclose would constitute 
a violation of SEC Rule 10b-5.206  
Applying the Court’s materiality definition in Basic, the Third Circuit 
reasoned that a violation of Item 303’s reporting requirements, focusing 
on current operations and management’s plans for the future,207 “does not 
automatically give rise to a material omission under Rule 10b-5.”208 The 
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court reasoned that Rule 10b-5 and Item 303 contain different standards 
for materiality.209 In essence, the court established a rebuttable 
presumption that Item 303 material omissions do not constitute securities 
fraud. The court’s reasoning has been the subject of a recent interpretive 
debate between the Second and Ninth Circuits.210 
B. The Ninth Circuit Applied the Oran Court’s Interpretation of Rule 
10b-5 as it Relates to Item 303 
Courts have announced varying interpretations of the Third Circuit’s 
holding in Oran.211 In 2008, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s 
dismissal of a plaintiff’s complaint, holding that Item 303 did not create a 
duty to disclose for purposes of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.212 
NVIDIA Corporation (“NVIDIA”) is a semiconductor company with 
its core business involving “the design and sale of two similar semi-
conductor chips”: one is a graphics-processing unit (“GPU”) and the other 
is a media and communications processor (“MCP”).213 GPUs and MCPs 
are both designed to function collaboratively with the products of “original 
equipment manufacturers (“OEMs”), such as Hewlett-Packard (“HP”) and 
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appears to state that Item 303 may provide a basis for liability if the parties 
sufficiently plead materiality under the probability–magnitude test. See 17 C.F.R. 
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 212. NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d at 1056 (indicating that the plaintiff 
did not adequately prove the scienter element of its claim against the defendant). 
Both GPUs and MCPs are comprised of “(1) a ‘die,’ or the silicon chip itself, and 
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the die to the motherboard’s electrical components.” The semiconductor chips are 
manufactured by mounting the die onto the substrate via “bumps” of solder. The 
bumps are merged to the substrate using a solder paste. An “underfill” separates 
the die and substrate. This is a “glue-like material” that acts as a supplementary 
bonding agent to stabilize the die–substrate connection. The solder and underfill, 
collectively, are referred to as the “Material Set.” Id. at 1048–49. 
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Dell Computer (“Dell”).”214 The processors are incorporated into the 
motherboards of computers assembled by companies such as HP and Dell, 
and the finished product is sold to the consumer.215 
Plaintiffs alleged that NVIDIA began receiving complaints in 
September 2006 that a number of its semiconductor products were 
experiencing cracks in the solder bumps when subject to excessive 
pressure.216 NVIDIA attempted to resolve the issue by changing the solder 
paste used to a more malleable compound, but new problems began arising 
in laptop computers containing NVIDIA’s semiconductors.217 HP and Dell 
both observed cracking of the solder bumps attaching the die to the 
substrate.218 HP discovered that the cause of the problem was a faulty 
thermal profile that caused stress on the solder bumps, and it shared its 
findings with NVIDIA.219 NVIDIA took note of these findings and 
informed its OEM customers that it would be reverting back to the old 
solder.220 
In November 2007, NVIDIA filed a Form 8-K stating that “[its] core 
businesses are continuing to grow as the GPU becomes increasingly 
central to today’s computing experience.”221 In February 2008, NVIDIA 
disclosed in its Form 8-K filing that its 2008 fiscal year was a record year 
and that the demand for GPUs was driving its growth.222 Finally, in May 
2008, NVIDIA disclosed in its Form 10-Q filing that one of its OEMs filed 
a claim for reimbursement due to an “alleged die/packaging material set 
defect.”223 NVIDIA’s July 2008 Form 8-K filing noted a $150 to $200 
million charge to cover costs associated with the die/packaging material 
set problems.224 The market reacted to this disclosure, causing NVIDIA’s 
stock value to drop 31%.225 
A lawsuit arose when purchasers of NVIDIA common stock brought 
a class action complaint against the corporation for securities fraud.226 The 
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investors claimed that NVIDIA knew, but failed to disclose, that prominent 
“customers . . . were complaining about problems with the company’s main 
products.”227 They contended that, pursuant to Item 303 of Regulation S-K, 
NVIDIA had a duty to disclose the possibility that the product defects would 
have substantial financial ramifications on the company.228 The trial court 
concluded that the plaintiffs failed to adequately allege scienter—a necessary 
element for a claim under either Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5—and dismissed 
without further leave to amend.229  
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that “[s]ilence, absent a duty to 
disclose, is not misleading under Rule 10b-5.”230 The court emphasized 
that Item 303 creates a much broader disclosure duty for management than 
what Basic requires because Item 303 requires disclosure of information 
“reasonably likely to have a material effect.”231 Ultimately, the court’s 
interpretation of the Oran holding was that Item 303 does not create a duty 
to disclose for purposes of 10b-5.232 As a result, NVIDIA was not liable 
for securities fraud under Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5.233 
C. The Second Circuit Declines to Follow the Ninth Circuit’s Incorrect 
Interpretation of Oran v. Stafford  
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit took a 
decidedly different approach than the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of 
Oran.234 In early 2015, the Second Circuit in Stratte-McClure v. Morgan 
Stanley, affirming the district court’s dismissal, held that the plaintiffs’ 
allegations that defendants made material misstatements and omissions to 
conceal Morgan Stanley’s exposure to and losses from the subprime 
mortgage market did not constitute a violation of Section 10(b).235  
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Morgan Stanley sparked the lawsuit in December 2006 when it 
executed a two-component proprietary trade.236 The trade involved a $2 
billion short position and a $13.5 billion long position.237 The short 
position involved the acquisition of credit-default swaps238 and 
collateralized debt obligations239 supported by “mezzanine tranches”240 of 
subprime residential mortgage-backed securities.241 Morgan Stanley, 
through the long position, bought the collateralized debt obligations.242 
Unfortunately, the housing bubble began bursting in mid-2006, 
causing delinquencies and defaults on subprime mortgages, like those 
backing Morgan Stanley’s proprietary trade.243 The effects of the bursting 
housing bubble caused Morgan Stanley to suffer immense financial losses 
on its proprietary trade.244 
Plaintiffs alleged that Morgan Stanley, as well as six of its officers and 
former officers, made numerous material misstatements and omissions to 
conceal the effects of Morgan Stanley’s subprime proprietary trade.245 
Expounding upon these allegations, the plaintiffs claimed that the 
fraudulent acts of Morgan Stanley inflated its stock price during the class 
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period and caused the plaintiffs to suffer financial loss when the market 
learned the truth about Morgan Stanley’s proprietary trade losses.246 
Observing that its judgment was adverse to the Ninth Circuit’s opinion 
in NVIDIA,247 the Second Circuit held that “a failure to make a required 
Item 303 disclosure . . . is indeed an omission that can serve as the basis 
for a Section 10(b) securities fraud claim . . . if it satisfies the materiality 
requirements outlined in [Basic].”248 This added to the court’s previous 
discussion of Item 303, in which it held that the omission of “known trends 
or uncertainties from a registration statement or prospectus is actionable 
under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.”249 The court 
reasoned that a quarterly filing, which includes Item 303 disclosures, is 
similar to registration statements and prospectuses.250  
An omission from an Item 303 disclosure would lead a reasonable 
investor to infer that “known trends or uncertainties . . . that the registrant 
reasonably expects will have a material . . . unfavorable impact on . . . 
revenues or income from continuing operations” are nonexistent.251 
Furthermore, the court noted that the Ninth Circuit incorrectly interpreted 
the Third Circuit’s conclusion in Oran by finding that “Item 303 violations 
are never actionable under Rule 10b-5.”252 Conversely, a proper 
interpretation of Oran suggests the possibility that a violation of Item 303 
could give rise to liability under Rule 10b-5.253 A material omission from 
Item 303, thus, may give rise to liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5 because Item 303 imposes a duty to speak.254 The Second Circuit 
nonetheless proceeded to affirm the district court’s dismissal of the 
plaintiffs’ exposure claim because the complaint failed to properly plead 
scienter.255 Unfortunately, the United States Supreme Court, in March of 
2015, left the conflict unresolved when it denied a petition for certiorari 
seeking to determine whether the Ninth Circuit or the Second Circuit 
correctly interpreted the law.256 However, all lower courts should adopt 
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the Second Circuit's approach because the philosophy of full disclosure 
outweighs the limited remedies available to an injured investor through 
the SEC.  
V. FAILURE TO UNVEIL THE CRYSTAL BALL SHOULD IMPOSE 
SECURITIES FRAUD LIABILITY 
The Exchange Act does not explicitly provide for a private right of 
action to enforce Section 10(b) and the rules and regulations promulgated 
thereunder.257 Accordingly, it may appear that the spirit of the Exchange 
Act was to provide a publicly administered enforcement regime, as 
opposed to a privately administrated enforcement regime. Resorting to this 
sort of interpretation would lead to inequitable results and would continue 
to enlarge the issues arising under management’s disclosure of forward-
looking information.  
Given that the core purpose of the Exchange Act is to implement a 
philosophy of full disclosure,258 investors negatively impacted by issuers’ 
fraudulent material omissions should have an action under Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5. To do otherwise would run contrary to the spirit of the 
Exchange Act. Failure to impose Rule 10b-5 liability for an issuer’s choice 
to withhold material forward-looking information promotes a less efficient 
market and hurts investors by denying them access to valuable information 
when making their investment decisions.259 The investor’s interest in 
receiving the information should outweigh a company’s interest in 
withholding the information. 
Absent a disclosure duty, a company’s omissions are not misleading 
as to Rule 10b-5 liability.260 That is, a disclosure duty is not established 
solely by the possession of material, non-public information.261 But, there 
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is an affirmative duty to disclose material, forward-looking information 
for purposes of nondisclosures under Section 11 of the Securities Act.262 
Circuits have found that an omission of known trends or uncertainties from 
a registration statement or prospectus is actionable under the Securities 
Act. 263 Logically, a material omission of Item 303 should provide a similar 
action for periodic disclosures under the Exchange Act. In essence, Item 
303 should include a per se duty to disclose. 
The Exchange Act, unlike the Securities Act, regulates the disclosure 
of information vis-à-vis periodic disclosure forms. The per se duty to 
disclose, for purposes of a Rule 10b-5 class action securities fraud lawsuit, 
arises because the issuer has a regulated responsibility to provide the SEC 
with up-to-date information.264 Although the general rule is that silence, 
absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading, this rule is inapposite to Item 
303 because the regulatory provisions establish a duty to disclose. 
Accordingly, a material omission of Item 303 is misleading because there 
is a disclosure duty impounded upon the issuer.  
An omission rendered “material” under the Court’s standard of 
materiality for speculative information265 should be applied in the context 
of a private securities fraud action pursuant to an Item 303 omission. A 
cease-and-desist action by the SEC is not as powerful of a deterrent as a 
financial punishment for misconduct, so it is necessary to establish 
alternative means of deterrence for material Item 303 omissions.266 
Although the SEC’s materiality standard for Item 303 does differ from the 
Court’s materiality standard,267 the SEC’s standard should only apply for 
agency administration actions. For example, the SEC should have broad 
authority to impose its cease-and-desist sanctions that prevent a company 
from continuing to violate federal securities laws or from engaging in a 
potential violation of the law. This does not account for the investors who 
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may have suffered financial losses.268 Although the SEC retains the power 
to impose disgorgement damages, this is an ineffective tool because it has 
only been wielded a handful of times in the context of an Item 303 
administrative action.269 Moreover, the SEC lacks the ability to impose the 
purest form of deterrent—punitive damages.270 For Rule 10b-5 claims, 
such as those in Morgan Stanley, NVIDIA, and Oran, the courts should be 
permitted to impose liability for securities fraud in favor of a class of 
injured investors.271 
Permitting courts to impose liability does not mean that an abundance 
of Rule 10b-5 claims for material MD&A omissions are going to arise and 
succeed.272 The threshold to bring a Rule 10b-5 action remains high. Not 
only must plaintiffs prove a material omission, but they must also prove 
scienter; a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the 
purchase or sale of a security; reliance; economic loss; and loss 
causation.273 As displayed in the illustrative cases, the claims are often 
disposed of for failure to satisfy the scienter requirement.274 The theory 
being proposed may in fact increase the quantity of securities fraud 
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litigation in federal district courts. While more litigation may arise, and 
many of these cases being dismissed for failure to satisfy the scienter 
requirement, the overarching policy of disclosure undoubtedly trumps the risk 
of vexatious litigation. 
Moreover, the issuers are very likely to be protected by the safe harbor 
provisions when they elect to disclose material forward-looking information. 
The safe harbor rules are designed “to encourage the voluntary disclosure of 
forward-looking information by removing the deterrent of liability for making 
such disclosures.”275 The instructions to Item 303 provide that “[a]ny forward-
looking information supplied is expressly covered by the safe harbor rule for 
projections[,]” including Rule 175.276 Rule 175 shields issuers from securities 
fraud liability when the qualifying forward-looking information is grounded 
in a reasonable basis and is disclosed in good faith.277 The SEC’s safe 
harbor rule for projections also excludes false forward-looking statements 
from securities fraud liability, as long as it was issued with a reasonable 
basis and in good faith.278 Moreover, a long line of cases has established a 
common law safe harbor known as the “bespeaks caution” doctrine.279 
This renders material information immaterial as a matter of law when the 
forward-looking statements are accompanied by meaningful cautionary 
statements that do not affect the “total mix” of information provided to the 
investor.280 Absent proper disclosure, however, these safeguards are 
inapplicable to a party trying to defeat a securities fraud lawsuit.281 
Therefore, the standard enumerated in Morgan Stanley should be 
adopted when a company fails to comply with Item 303 in a periodic 
disclosure. Rule 10b-5 liability must arise when an omission of 
speculative, forward-looking information is material under Basic and the 
other elements of Rule 10b-5 have been established.282 
CONCLUSION 
Investors should have the ability to unveil a securities issuer’s “crystal 
ball.” That is, investors should have access to all material forward-looking 
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information at management’s disposal. Recently, a federal circuit split arose 
on this exact controversy. The circuits dispute whether Item 303 imposes a 
disclosure duty upon a federal securities issuer. This determination is critical 
to investors seeking to bring a federal securities fraud claim for an omission 
of material forward-looking information because absent a duty to disclose, 
an omission is not misleading under Rule 10b-5. Issuers should be held 
liable for federal securities fraud when their actions fraudulently run 
contrary to the clear intent of federal securities laws because Item 303 
indeed imposes a disclosure duty upon an issuer. Barring investors from 
bringing a lawsuit for such an omission runs contrary to Congress’s intent 
to implement full disclosure and the SEC’s intent to permit an investor to 
look through the eyes of management.  
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